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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON 
STATE REGULATORY AND 
PROTECTIONIST POLICIES 
PETER M. GERHART* 
Associate Professor of Law, 
Ohio State University College of Law 
Because our times appropriately can be termed a "deregulation 
era"-an era marked by increasing faith in the competitive market and 
increasing skepticism about the wisdom of government regulation 1-it is 
timely to explore whether and how the deregulation philosophy is 
embodied in constitutional interpretation-specifically to see in what 
way the Constitution limits state restrictions on competitive markets. 
For a backdrop to this discussion, of course, we must go back to the 
mid-1 930s, a time when faith in the market system was significantly less 
than it is today. Faced with a perceived need for government interven-
tion to regulate the vigors of competition, the Supreme Court rejected 
*Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank 
Mitchell Axler, a third-year student at the Georgetown University Law Center, for his 
splendid assistance in preparing this paper. 
'See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAws AND PROCEDURES, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 177 (1979); .A-ME..lUC.A_l\l BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, fEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO 
REFORM (1978) (Exposure Draft); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 
preamble, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) ("To ... encourage, develop, and attain an air transporta-
tion system which relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety, and 
price of air services, and for other purposes."). 
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the doctrine of economic due process2 and thus stopped reviewing the 
reasonableness of regulatory legislation to see whether that legislation 
was consistent with the judges' view of constitutionally protected 
competitive freedom. Since then, the Court has refused to review the 
wisdom of state economic regulation, upholding it against every 
substantive challenge by finding some connection, no matter how 
tenuous, between the regulation and an asserted proper state purpose. 3 
I mention this at the outset to emphasize that competitive values are 
given only a limited scope of constitutional protection. But I also want to 
suggest that th~ jurisprudential thought underlying the rise and fall of 
substantive, economic due process still influences the Court's interpreta-
tion of other constitutional provisions. Indeed, I believe that the Court is 
stili living vvithin L~e shadow of the ecoriomic due process cases; still 
reacting to the criticism of the 1 930s and 1940s that exposed the 
institutional and antidemocratic weaknesses of economic due process 
review. 4 
'The era of economic due process review (the Lochner era) began with Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) and ended with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). The era takes its name from the most famous economic due process case, 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 ( 1905 ). The end of the era was signaled as early as 1934 
when the Supreme Court upheld a state mortgage moratorium law, Home Building and 
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and state milk price control regulations, 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Approval of New Deal legislation quickly 
followed Parrish (upholding minimum wage laws): NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. l (1937) (National Labor Relations Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act). The Court explicitly repudiated the economic due 
process doctrine in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 
U.S. 525 (1949). 
'In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court "emphatically refuse[d] to go 
back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, 
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvi-
dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.'" 372 U.S. at 731-32, quoting 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). In North Dakota State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. I 56 (I973), the Court overruled Liggett 
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), which it described as belonging to "that vintage of 
decisions which exalted substantive due process" and as "a derelict in the stream of the 
law." 4I4 U.S. at 164, I67. The Court found "little discussion" necessary to reject the 
substantive due process arguments raised, but virtually abandoned, in Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. I 17, 122 (1978), discussed in other respects in the text 
accompanying notes 58 to 84 infra. 
·'See P. MuRPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 68-82, 99-I IO (1972). An 
important retrospective review of economic due process is McClosky, Economic Due Process 
and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, I 962 SuP. CT. REv. 34 (1962). See also 
Strong, Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, I5 Aruz. L. 
REv. 4I9 (1973). But cf R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw,§§ 25.I, 28.4 (2d ed. 
I 977) (economic rights and individual rights should receive the same treatment). 
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I will develop this theme, and add another to it, by briefly outlining 
four constitutional provisions that do limit state regulatory powers: (1) 
the First Amend.ment protection of commercial speech; (2) cases 
invalidating state regulation as an undue burden on interstate com-
merce; (3) the concept of procedural due process; and (4) the suprema-
cy clause, focusing today on the preemptive effect of Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) rules. 
My theme throughout is this: Although the Supreme Court's 
sometimes timid review of state regulatory legislation may be explained 
by. it~ continued allergic reaction to economic due process review, that 
timidity is often unwarranted because the Constitution does embody 
several principles that protect the free market from some forms of state 
intervention. 
PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
I will not spend much time with the First Amendment cases5 already 
discussed by Stanley, but those cases do illustrate my themes. Commer-
cial speech is protected because of its importance in a competitive 
5The important commercial speech cases are Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada 
Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 440 U.S. 941 (1979), aff'g448 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Nev. 1978) 
(three-judge court) (reasonableness standard, not least restrictive alternative standard, 
applies to regulations not completely suppressing commercial speech); Friedman v. 
Rogers, 440 U.S I (1979) (because trade name is pure commercial speech and may be 
misleading and deceptive, state may regulate its use); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. 447 (1978) (state permitted to regulate lawyers' in-person solicitation); In re Primus, 
436 U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyers' solicitation to advance political benefits entitled to full First 
Amendment protection); First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (bank's 
attempt to influence state referendum entitled to full protection); Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising of availability and price of routine 
services is protected commercial speech); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977) (state cannot completely suppress truthful advertising of lawful products and 
services); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (truthful 
commercial speech protected when regulation directed to content, rather than time, place, 
manner); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech is not wholly outside protection of First Amendment); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (IQ75) (ad for abortion clinic did more than propose 
purely commercial transaction and was protected speech); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (newspaper employment 
ads classified by sex are illegal, no neeq to consider overruling Chrestensen); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (196'1) (profit motive of newspaper in printing 
editorial advertising did not undermine First Amendment defense); Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (First Amendment does not protect purely commercial advertis-
ing). 
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market, 6 so the commercial speech cases do elevate free market 
principles to constitutional level, at least insofar as commercial speech is 
perceived to be important to efficient markets and the state has not made 
the underlying competitive activity unlawfuJ.7 But the balancing test 
used by the Court to decide commercial speech cases8 looks very much 
like a repackaged economic due process analysis, inviting Supreme 
Court reconsideration of the state's determination that it is wise to 
sacrifice market efficiency for some other purpose. 9 Given the Court's 
premise that commercial speech is a protected value, their balancing test 
is app~opriate. But because the balancing test looks so much like 
substantive, economic review, I suspect that the Court will apply its 
balancing test gingerly, leaving states plenty of leeway to intervene in the 
marketplace of words. Indeed, 1 believe this may be the message of the 
last three cases decided by the Court, 10 all of which upheld state 
regulation of pure commercial speech. 
For example, last term in Friedman v. Roger, 11 the Court upheld the 
'Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). ("So long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure 
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest 
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.") 
Protection of commercial speech may also be based on other, non-economic values. 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, for example, noted the social value of getting important price 
information to "the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged," emphasizing that the 
"consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not 
keener by far, than ·his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 425 U.S. at 763. 
The Court also tried to support the commercial speech doctrine as necessary to 
"enlightened public decision making in a democracy," citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 425 U.S. at 765. See generally TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 654-55 (1978). 
7Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 772 (1976) ("no claim that the transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements 
are themselves illegal in any way"); cf Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm', 
413 U.S. 376 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
934 (1972). 
"Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. l, 1l-I6 (1979). See Roberts, Toward a General Theory of 
Commncial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 Omo ST. L.J. I15, I38 (1979). 
"This point is persuasively made in Jackson and Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. l (1979); cf Baker, Commercial Speech: A 
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. I (1970). 
10Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. l'.Jevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 440 U.S. 941 
(1979) affg 448 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Nev. 1978) (three-judge court); Friedman v. Rogers, 
440 U.S. I (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio S~ate Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
11440 U.S. I (1979). 
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Texas Optometry Act, which forbids the practice of optometry under a 
trade or corporate name. Consumers claimed that because trade names 
communicate information concerning price, quality and the availability 
of routine services, the ban on trade names violated their right to receive 
information about optometric services. 12 The state defended by arguing 
that,'l.n personal service industries, trade names potentially mislead the 
public by creating an artificial distinction between the source of services 
and the identification of that source, thus disguising changes in 
personnel; absolving optometrists frorri dependence on their personal 
reputation; and, if different trade names are used for essentially similar 
· services, creating the f~lse impression of competition where none 
exists. 1s 
To balance these competing contentions, the Court had to determine 
whether, in a competitive system, using trade names is so much more 
valuable than using personal names that freedom to use a trade name 
outweighs the state's interest in avoiding the risk of misuse and 
deception. The Court held that trade names do not have such value; 
that, in fact, the significant competitive benefits of trade names can be 
achieved with pe~sonal names, and that the risks of deceptive use are 
significant. 14 
By refusing to give constitutional protection to the inherent attractive-
ness of names, the Court leaves the states free to continue to develop the 
common and statutory law of trademarks as they desire. The suppres-
sion of t~ademarks through antidilution statutes, 15 for example, remains 
unfettered by the Constitution. To the extent that this allows the states to 
remain "laboratories for experiment"16 in regulating trademark rights, 
Friedman appears to be a wise decision. 
One cannot escape the conclusion, however, that the Court has taken 
a fundamental turn away from the aggressive protection of efficiencies 
"Jd. at 6--7. 
"Jd. at I2-I3. 
"In the Court's view, the kind, price, and quality of services that the public normally 
associates with a trade name can be communicated directly just as easily as through trade 
name association. /d. at I6. 
"See generally Pattishall, Dilution Rationole for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its 
Progress and Prospects, 67 T.M. REP. 607 (I977); Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark 
Dilution and the Antitrust Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 439 (I956). 
16New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
I, I3 (1979). ("Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation.") 
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from unrestrained commercial speech that was apparent in earlier 
commercial speech cases. 17 The COurt acknowledged that in a competi-
tive market trademarks serve to indicate common ownership and to affix 
responsibility. 18 For the highly mobile American public, trademarks 
provide a quick and sure index to service, quality, and price, and thus 
achieve considerable efficiencies for consumers by reducing search costs. 
Trademarks facilitate the growth of multimarket enterprises by allowing 
advertising dollars to cover more locations and by permitting the good 
will ofone outlet to enhance the competitive potential of other outlets. 
In turn, multimarket enterprises can achieve economies of scale and 
standardized services that benefit consumers. 19 
Rather than deciding that such efficiencies support First Amendment 
protection, however, the Court decided just the opposite: namely, that a 
state could validly prohibit the use of trade names to "discourage" those 
"large scale commercial practices with numerous branch offices."~ 0 In 
other words, because states are permitted to supplant unfettered 
competition ·with other forms of economic ordering, they should be 
permitted to restrict commercial speech as a means to that end. 
17The Court see~s to have acknowledged as much. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech occupies a subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values; overbreadth anaiysis does not apply to commercial speech). 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (Court will "act with caution" in this area and will not 
automatically extend traditional First Amendment protection "to this as yet unchartered 
area"). 
10440 U.S. l, 11 (1979). See also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge 
Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1 942) ("A trademark is a merchandising short cut which induces a 
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led tb believe he wants. The owner 
of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the 
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the 
means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of 
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is 
attained, the trademark owner has something of value"); Smith v. Chane!, Inc., 402 F.2d 
562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968). ("Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the 
trademark owner's products ... serves an important public purpose. 1t makes effective 
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means through 
which the consumer can identify products which please him and reward the producer with 
continued patronage. Without some such method of product identification, informed 
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exis1.") Compnre 
Leeds, Trademarks from the Govemment Viewpoint, 44 CAL. L. REV. 489 (1 956) and Rogers, 
The Lanham Act and the Social Function ofTrademarils, l4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 173 (1 949) 
with Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection Sy·mbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 
(1948) and Papandreou, The Economic Effect ofTrademm·ks, 44 CAL. L. REv. 503 (1956). 
1
'440 U.S. at 13. 
'"Id. at 13. 
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Although this conclusion flows naturally from the principle that states 
have wide latitude to determine their internal economic organization, 
and can thus be seen to follow from the demise of economic due process 
analysis, the logic seems to be at odds with the premise of both Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy and Bates, which adopted the principle that if the 
underlying competitive activity is lawful, a state may not restrict truthful 
descriptions of that activity.21 
This emphasizes that if the rationale behind the protection of 
commercial speech is the protection of economic efficiency, a conflict is 
inevitable between the state's "right" to regulate and the First Amend-
ment protection of efficiency-producing commercial speech. In the 
absence of some other principle supporting the protection of commer-
cial speech-one that is more neutral because it raises no question about 
the wisdom of the state's decision to forego economic e:fficiency22-the 
commercial speech cases necessarily must be decided against a backdrop 
of conflict with economic due process doctrines. My guess is that the 
result will be fewer limitations on state regulation of commercial speech 
than had originally been anticipated. 23 
STATE BURDENS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
If Supreme Court deference to the regulatory autonomy of the states 
is understandable in the commercial speech cases, it is less necessary, 
and sometimes inexplicable, in interstate commerce cases, the second 
source of constitutional restriction on state regulation. The Court, of 
"See supra note 7. 
"Policies other than economic efficiency have been proposed to support the protection 
of pure commercial speech, see note 6 supra, but they are of questionable substance. See 
Jackson and Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. 
L. REv. 1 (1979), Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 436 (1971). Indeed, in Friedman the 
Court may have moved away from a social-political rationale for protecting commercial 
speech. 440 U.S. at 10-11, n.9. 
"Of course, commercial speech that does more than propose a commercial transac-
tion will continue to be protected, without regard to an efficiency rationale, because 
of the importance of its content in a democratic society. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 
(1978) (lawyers' solicitation to advance political belief is protected); First Nat'! Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (bank's attempt to influence result of state 
referendum entitled to full protection); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 
431 U.S. 85 (1977) (political expression through a For Sale sign protected); Carey v. Popu-
lation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive information concerns activity 
with which state may not interfere); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (ad for 
abortion clinic). 
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course, has long struck down state regulation that unduly burdens 
interstate commerceY those cases, premised on the notion that the 
Constitution protects free competition between the states,25 ' do give 
constitutional footing to free market principles. 
Under its neg~~ive commerce clause cases, the Court balances the 
bui,dens . on interstate commerce from state regulation against the 
nature' of the state interest in protecting its citizens. 26 When a state 
adopts health or safety measures, such as weight restrictions or product 
standarps, and tl::tose measures have only a minimal effect on interstate 
'''See U.S. CaNST.· art. ':( § 8, cl. 3: ''The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate 
Commeri:e witli. foreign ·Nations, and among the several States." The negative implications 
of this affirmative grant of power were assumed from the beginning. See generally THE 
FEDERALIST Nos. 41, 42. See also 3M. FARRAND, REcoRDS oF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 
1778, ~t 547; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) l (1824) (dictum); Brown v. Maryland, 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262, 268 (1827) (state taxation). See also the several opinions in The 
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 513 (1846) and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 122 
(1848). See generally Tushnet, Rethinhing the Donnant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125 
(1979); Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the BuTgeT CouTt, 74 Nw. L. REv. 409 (1979). 
"That premise was articulated by Justice Jackson in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949): "Our system, fo,stered by the Commerce Clf!use, is that every 
farmer and every craftsman shall· be encouraged to produce by the certainty tl1at he will 
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
exports, and that no foreign srate will by customs duties or regulation exclude them. 
Liltewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in 
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any." See. also Allenberg Cotton Co. v. 
Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (refusal of l\>lississippi to enforce contract for goods destined 
out of state violates commerce clause); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Corrim'n,.432 U.S. 333,350 (1977) ("national 'common market'"): Although the immedic 
ate rationale of the commerce clause cases is economic, the underlying concern is often 
perceived to be political-namely, the preservation of federal interests against local, and 
often parochial, legislative protectionism. The function of the Court is thus seen to be to 
preserve the status quo until Congress h·as addressed the proper balance between 
competition and protectionism from a national perspective. Brown, The Open Economy: 
justice Franlifitrter a?1.d the Position of the judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957); McAllister, Court, 
Congress and Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 144 (1940). · 
. "The test most frequently cited is from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.. 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970): "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the 
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a 
lesser impact on interstate activities." 
This article does not consider the validity of state Laxation under the commerce clause. 
See generally Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative CommeTce Clause and the New 
Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of"S tate Ta," Exempt 
Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1978); TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw 344 (1978). 
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commerce, th~ regulation is generally upheld.27 On the other hand, 
when the state l'egulation is perceived to discriminate in either purpose 
or effect against out-of-state goods, the state regulation survives only 
upon a strong showing of compelling local interest that cannot be 
achieved by other, less restrictive, means.28 Even state regulation that is 
neutral, however-regulation that evenhandedly affects in-state and 
out~of-'state goods-will be struck down if firms are subject to such 
widely different standards of conduct in different states that compliance 
with all standards is either impossible or unduly expensive/9 or if the 
state is attempting to keep business that would otherwise go elsewhere. 30 
Under these standards, the Court must determine whether the end 
sought to be achieved by the. state is significant enough to justify the 
burden on, or discrimii'lation against, i..t>terstate commerce. Significantly, 
the Court has held that the protection of state citizens from competition 
with products of other .states is never a legitimate state goal.31 In other 
words, under the Constitution, state regulation whose purpose or 
"See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. and Pac. Ry. Co., 393 
U.S. 129 (1968) (upholding Arkansas full-crew law); South Carolina State Highway Dep't 
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding truck width and weight restrictions). 
Earlier cases had reached the same result by finding the burden on interstate commerce to 
be only "indirect" and "incidental." Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (state licensing 
requirement); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (19ll) (full crew 
requirement); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Coinm., 283 U.S. 380 (1931) (safety 
equipment requirement). 
'"Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1979) (ban on exportation of in-state minnows); 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (statute prohibiting use of 
Pennsylvania garbage for landfill); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) 
(local inspection requirement struck down); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) 
(statute requiring local health inspection effectively stopped imports). Compare Hughes v. 
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state subsidies not required to be given 
evenhandedly to out-of-state firms); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 
(1978). 
29Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (prohibition on double 
trailers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (conflicting mudguard 
statutes); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (conflicting train length 
requirements). Compare Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 ( 1960) 
(municipal antipollution ordinance upheld). 
'
0 397 U.S. at 145. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (state may not require 
shrimp caught off its coast be locally packed); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 
U.S. 1 ( 1928) (state may not forbid export of shrimp that had not undergone processing). 
'
1Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375 (1964) (state 
regulation that reserves substantial share of market to local producers invalid). See Baldwin 
v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (prohibiting denial of license to dealer who obtained milk in 
another state at price below that set for in-state purchases); discussed in the text 
accompanying note 75 infra; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (denial of certificate 
of convenience and necessity). 
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natural effect is to protect state producers or sellers from competition 
with out-of-state products is per se unlawfuJ.32 
Often, the Court avoids a frontal examination of the state purpose by 
analyzing not the end sought to be achieved by the state but the means 
employed to reach that end. Thus, as in standard rule of reason 
analysis, 33 the Court determines whether other means of achieving the 
state interest would have a less burdensome impact on commerce; if so, 
the regulation will be struck down. 3·1 Moreover, the Court applies the 
so-called means-ends test, determining whether the means chosen by the 
state are reasoi1ably likely to achieve its goal. 35 If Lhey are not, the Court 
is likely to overturn the state action, reasoning that burdens on interstate 
commerce should not be tolerated if it is unclear whether the purported 
local purpose will be achieved.36 
These tests put significant limits on state regulatory authori-
ty. Although they do not give the Court freedom to review directly 
the wisdom of state regulation, nor to apply directly the competi-
tion standards of the Sherman Act,37 they do permit the Court to strike 
down legislation that impedes formation of a more perfect economic 
union.38 
Indeed, in the last ten yea:rs the Court has been vigilant' i11 its review of 
"By contrast, nondiscriminatory state regulation that protects local interests by limiting 
production has been upheld. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 
(1939) (state price regulation where most products sold intrastate); Cities Service Gas Co. 
v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (state price regulation where most 
products sold interstate; justified as conservation measure); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 
(1943) (state production controls upheld as consistent with federal policy). 
"See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
"The classic case is Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1 951) (local health 
interests could be protected by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.) Two recent 
cases relying, in part, on an analysis of the means chosen by the state are Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1 977), discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 51-56 infra, and Great Atlantic 8c Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 
366 (1 976), discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-50 infra. 
"See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779 (1945) (Arizona regulation 
limiting train length "viewed as a safety measure, affords at most slight and dubious 
advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths"). 
'"Jd. at 775-76, 781-82. 
"15 U.S.C. §§ l-7 (1973). 
""[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states 
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union 
and not division." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
PETER M. GERHART 1361 
state regulation, striking down economic regulation in six cases,SO a 
nearly perfect record40 until i~ decided the Exxon41 case in 1978. I will 
discuss the Exxon opinion at some length today, but for contrast let me 
first outline what I call the cornucopia cases, cases in which the Supreme 
Court applied the commerce clause. to liberate trade of, first, canta-
loupes, then milk, then apples, and finally fish. 
. . • . . ~ . I . . 
In its 1970 decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 42 the Court invalidated 
an order of an Arizona agriculture official that prohibited the plaintiff, a 
local ·grower, from transporting uncrated cantaloupes to California for 
packing and processing. The order purported to eff~ctuate an 4-rizona 
consumer protection statute requiring Arizon,a fruits and vegetables to 
be packed ·in state-approved containers prior to interstate shipment.43 
The practical impact of the order, however, was to require plai.t1ti:lf to 
build an Arizona packing facility, 44 and this violated the commerce 
clause principle that states may not require business operations to be 
performed within the state.45 Moreover, given the acknowledged 
superiority of plaintiff's cantaloupes, the real purpose of the order was 
not to protect consumers, but to enhance the reputation of Arizo.oa 
growers by identifying plaintiff's high quality products with Arizona,46 a 
more tenuous state purpose when viewed against the "straitjacket"47 in 
which plaintiff's business was placed by the order. 
The "milk" case is Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Cottrell. 48 
'
9 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (limits on export of minnows); City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617(1978) (prohibition on importation of solid and 
liquid waste); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (limits on truck 
length); Hunt v. Washington· State Ap.ple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) 
(regulations requiring that only cert<l.in grades appear on apple containers); Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (regulation requiring other states to sign 
reciprocity agreement before their milk is sold in state); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137 (1970) (statute requiring packaging in state before interstate shipment). 
'
0But see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 797 (I 976) (state subsidy program 
slightly favoring in-state businesses is justified and not unlawful). 
"Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
4
'397 U.S. 137 (1970). . 
"Id. at 138. 
44ld. at 140. 
"!d. at 145. See cases cited in note 30 supra. 
'"!d. at 144. The Court did not consider whether Arizona could order plaintiff to identify 
his California-packed cantaloupes as Arizona grown, but that was clearly a less restrictive 
way of achieving the same end. 
47Id. at 145-46. 
48 424 u.s. 366 (1976). 
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Mississippi regulations required other states to sign a reciprocity 
agreement with Mississippi before that state's milk could be sold in 
Mississippi. A&P challenged the regulation when Mississippi refused it 
permission to ship mille from Louisiana, which would not sign a 
reciprocity agreement, to Mississippi stores. Although the proposed 
reciprocity agreements incorporated minimum health standards, the 
Court, looking to the regulations as a whole, rejected Mississippi's 
"protection of health" argument as "frivolous""19 because the agreements 
permitted a reduction of standards by mutual consent. Moreover, in the 
Court's view, health standards could be enforced by less burdensome 
measures-including inspection of milk at the state border. At any rate, 
the milk A&P wanted to import did meet. Mississippi standards, and 
Mississippi could not deny it entry as a way of bludgeoning Louisiana to 
accept Mississippi mille. 50 
The starkest contrast to the Exxon opinion is the searching examina-
tion of the facially neutral statute at issue in Hunt v. Washington State 
Apple AdveTtising Comrnission, 51 decided just one year before Exxon. 
Washington state officials challenged a North Carolina requirement that 
closed containers of apples sold in or shipped into North Carolina bear 
only the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) grade. The require-
ment purported to standardize grades in order to prevent consumer 
deception allegedly caused by inconsistent grading systems of several 
states. 5 2 The facts revealed, however, that Washington apple grades were 
in all cases at least the equivalent of, and in some cases more stringent 
than, USDA standards,53 so the consumer was being protected from a 
possible confusion that could only benefit him. Moreover, because 
apples rarely reach consumers in closed containers, it was doubtful that 
the statute was a consumer protection measure at all; it directly 
protected only wholesalers and brokers, who presumably have the 
intellectual and financial resources to untangle any confusion. 5·1 More 
significantly, the Court detected an "insidious" effect of the statute. 
Although \Nashington apple growers had worked hard to promote both 
their products and their grading program, the statute had a "leveling"55 
'
9ld. at 375. 
50ld. at 369, 380-381. 
51 432 u.s. 333 (1977). 
"Id. at 349. 
"Id. at 351. 
'·'Jd. at 352. 
55/d. at 351. 
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effect, reqmnng them to downgrade their products, an effect which 
operated to the great advantage of North Carolina apple growers. This 
effect, together with the acknowledgment by a state agriculture official 
that the statute was passed at the behest of local apple growers/6 
convinced the Court to invalidate the statute. 
Finally, as if to emphasize the potency of the commerce clause, just 
last term the Court overruled an eighty-year-old precedent to hold that a 
state may not prohibit the out-of-state shipment or sale of minnows 
originating in natural streams in the state. 57 
In contrast with those cases, the analysis adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Exxon is disappointing. At issue there was the Maryland statute 
prohibiting gasoline refiners and producers from owning retail gas 
stations in Maryiand, a statute aliegedly designed to preserve competi-
tion by protecting independent dealers from so-called unfair competi-
tion with their dual distributing suppliers. The Court upheld the statute. 
Because there are no Maryland producers or refiners, 58 only out-of-
state firms were required to divest ownership of retail outlets, but the 
statute was said to be nondiscriminatory because it would have applied 
in the same way to in-state refiners and producers had there been any. 
No burden on interstate commerce was found because the statute· did 
not change the volume of gasoline purchased and sold by Maryland 
retailers and therefore, according to the Court, did not have the 
forbidden effect of inhibiting the flow of products acro~s state lines. 59 
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that vertical relationships in the 
gasoline industry hav_e such an essentially interstate character that they 
may be regulated only by Congress. 60 
By asserting that the case involved neither a burden on interstate 
commerce, nor discriminatory treatment, nor subject matter that 
requires a uniform, national standard, the Court turned its back on the 
intricate analysis and balancing process of its prior commerce clause 
decisions. The Court avoided analyzing Maryland's interest in protect-
ing independent service station operators from vertical integration and 
'"Jd. at 352. 
57Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 
519 (1896). "' 
58437 U.S. at 125. 
'
9Id. at 127. 
'
0Id. at I 28. 
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never questioned whether the means adopted by Maryland were either 
reasonably likely or reasonably necessary to achieve its end. 1 believe this 
is unfortunate. In an area of law touched by so many important, yet 
ephemeral, intei·ests, conclusions should not be reached, or labels 
applied, until after sensitive analysis of the interests is completed. By 
substituting conclusory labels for hard analysis the Court failed to 
illuminate the scope or underpinnings of its decision. 
For example,. several small, independent refiners claimed that the 
divestiture statute would forcethem to stop selling gasoline in Maryland. 
Without ownership and control of their retail outlets, they daimed, they 
wuld not continue their- successful nonbrand, low-price marketing. 61 
The Court did not address the factual accuracy of this contention; nor 
did it attempt to balance the dama!!e from the alleged forced eviction 
from Maryiand's markets against"' .Maryland's asserted interests in 
regulating vertical relationships. Rather, the majority said that even if 
independent, out-of-state refiners did stop selling in Maryland, com-
merce would hot be burdened because those sellers would be replaced 
by other refiners. 6~ 
This is a troubling conclusion. If, as the Court has repeatedly said, 63 
the commer~e _clause is to protect the freedom of traders to enter 
interstate markets, the proper analysis should be to dete,rmine whether 
the restricti~m on the freedom of the independent refiners to sell in 
Maryland-if in fact there is a significant restriction-should be sacri-
ficed to protect Maryland's local interests. It is only a bloodless 
abstraction to say, as the Court did, that the commerce clause protects 
commerce and not individual competitors, because free interstate 
competition depends on the freedom of individual competitors. It was 
only competitors who were protected when the Court struck down state 
regulation in Hunt6·1 and Cottrell, 5 5 and but a single interstate competitor 
was protected from the heavy hand of the state in Pike. 66 
In addition, to say, as the Court does, that a "valid" regulation is not 
6
'1d. at 127. 
6
'1d. at 127. According to the Court: "Interstate commerce is not subjected to an 
impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business 
to shift from one interstate supplier to another." 
63See note 25 supra. 
6
"Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
65 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (I 976). 
66 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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invalid simply because business shifts from one interstate supplier to 
another6~ is a truism only because it assumes the answer to the central 
issue. Because the Court never analyzed what makes a regulation 
"valid," it was unable to say whether the eviction of these competitors 
from a state's commerce would infringe the values protected by the 
commerce dause. 58 
The Court also mishandled the plaintiffs' contention that because 
vertical integration in the oil industry is a matter of national, not local, 
concern it requires a uniform national policy and thus precludes state1 
regulation. One of the established purposes of the commerce clause is to 
ensure that firms are not subject to state~imposed standards of conduct 
so conflicting that compliance with the laws of one state materially 
increases the burden of complying with the law or policy of another 
state.69 Where uniformity is essential, Congress and not the states must 
set the standard. 7° Following this principle, plaintiffs argued that 
conflicting state policies concerning the permissibility of vertical integra-
tion posed just such a conflict. Although correct in noting that state 
legislation is rarely invalidated mi this ground, 71 the Court missed the 
point, I believe, when it replied that the plaintiffs actually feared 
uniform divestiture requirements in many states rather than inconsis-
tent requirements between states. 72 If vertical integration in some states 
depends on management and distribution efficiencies from vertical 
integration in several states, Maryland's ban on vertical integration may 
effectively inhibit integration in those states that do not ban it, states that 
may therefore be presumed to favor vertical integration. I doubt 
67437 U.S. 127. 
"'Moreover, by focusing on whether state regulation changes the amount of commerce 
crossing state lines, the Court does itself a disservice by seeming to suggest that statutes 
that increase output are permissible, while those that decrease output by decreasing 
competition are suspect. Yet that analysis seems directly at odds with the Court's desire to 
preserve some state autonomy to select internal economic goals, including the right to 
substitute anticompetitive regulation for competition. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 
341 (1943) (upholding California plan for regulating the supply of raisins even though 95 
percent of raisins destined for interstate market); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & 
Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 ( 1950) (upholding state fixing of price paid by natural gas pipeline to 
local suppliers); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939) 
(upholding state's fixing of price charged by local milk dealers to state-based firm selling 
milk in interstate commerce). 
••see cases cited in note 29 supra. 
'"Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851). 
71The Court cited Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), and 
Cooley, supra note 70, in support of its view. 
72437 U.S. at 128. 
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whether economies of multistate vertical integration are such that 
Maryland's ban on vertical integration would impede vertical integration 
in a neighboring state, but this is an issue that should have been 
addressed directly on the facts, not by ignoring the effect of Maryland's 
statute on the policy of those states that permit, and that presumably 
want to take advantage of, the efficiencies of vertical integration. 
Even more troubling is the Court's treatment of the discrimination 
issue. In the context of the Exxon case, of course, the term "discrimina-
tion" is a linguistic toy. The majority found no discrimination because 
the statute applied to both in-state and out-of-state firms. 73 Justice 
Blackmun, in his solo dissent, argued that the legislation was discrimina-
tory because it affected only out-of-state firms; no Maryland producers 
or refiners exist and thus none are affected. 74 Both, of course, are 
correct in their own way: Maryland should not be barred from 
legitimately regulating vertical relationships within the state merely 
because there are no in-state firms to regulate. On the other hand, 
attempts to forestall competition from out-of~state sources should not be 
permitted to hide behind the ]abel of "even-handedness" when in fact no 
in-state competition could be suppressed by the regulation. But trying to 
analyze the concept of discrimination linguistically or semantically te!1s 
us nothing about what should be the central focus: determining the 
permissible scope of state regulatory power by analyzing the state's 
objective and the relationship between that objective and the nature of 
the interstate compelition being regulated. 
Although state anticompetitive regulation is. not itself barred by the 
commerce clause, I believe analysis should start from the proposition 
that the commerce clause forbids a state from adopting economic 
regulation that takes away the advantages of out-of-state production or 
interstate distribution. This was the central message of Judge Cardozo in 
his venerable 1935 opinion in Baldwin v. Seelig, 75 where the Court struck 
down part of the New York Milk Control Act that required purchases of 
Vermont milk for resale in New York to be made at the price fixed for 
New York mille. Although the regulation of New York milk prices had 
earlier been held to be constitutional/6 and the restriction on Vermont 
competition was arguably necessary to support that regulation, the 
"Jd. at 125. 
74ld. at 135. 
"294 U.S. 511 (1935 ). 
"Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
PETER M. GERHART 1367 
restriction could not· stan:d because it was "equivalent to a rampart of 
customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place 
of origin."77 Following this wisdom,· a commerce clause interpretation 
that protects the competitive advantages of out-of-state production and 
interstate distribution furthers the central purpose behind the com-
merce clause-to keep freedom of interstate trade untrammeled.78 
That interpretation would not diminish a state's authority to regulate 
competition within the state by, for example, proscribing unfair practic-
es or substituting regulation of in-state activity for competition.79 And 
s~ICh state power would not be diminished merely because out-of-state 
firms must' comply with the regulation. In Exxon; the Court evidently felt 
that protecting unintegrated retail dealers from the risks associated with 
dual distribution >vas just such a permissible :exercise of state police 
power,80 and insofar as the risks being protected against arise from local 
activity or conduct, the Court was undoubtedly c?rrect. 
But, I believe the Court should also have asked whether Maryland's 
protection against dual distribution was essentially regulating local 
competition and practices or was in effect protecting local competitors 
from the competitive advantage that others have because they are 
out-of-state or interstate traders. In short, was Maryland really protect-
ing against the dange~s of a price or supply squeeze of local 
independents-which I assume to be local activities subject to state 
regulation--or was it protecting state citizens from having to compete 
against efficiencies of multistate or interstate integration-which I would 
expect to be unlawful under the commerce clause. 
Objective evidence suggests that the latter was true. Fi~st, the 
divestiture statute applied to the out-of-state independent refiners, even 
though those refiners distributed only through company-owned stations 
and thus presented no danger that dual distribution would result in a 
price or supply squ.eeze;81 Second, and conversely, independent Mary-
land wholesalers, who distributed through both company-owned and 
77 294 U.S. at 527. 
'"See note 25 supra. See, e.g., FARRAND, RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VoL ll, 
308; VoL III, 478,547-48 (1911); THE FEDERALIST, No. XLII (Madison). 
'"See California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) (upholding statute requiring that all 
local ticket agents for auto tours, whether intrastate or interstate, obtain a license and a 
bond). 
80437 U.S. at 124-25, 127-28. 
"'Brief of Petitioner Exxon Corp. at 249, 259, Law Reprints Trade Reg. Series, VoL 11, 
No.5. 
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independent stations, were not required to divest their company-owned 
stations, even though their dual distribution systems conceivably gave 
rise to the conduct the divestiture statute purported to protect against. 82 
Certainly, the failure to provide ailY explanation for including interstate 
traders who presented no dual distribution risks and excluding in-state 
traders who did, suggest that the legislation was not designed to protect 
against vertical integration itself, but only against interstate vertical 
integration. Finally, as Justice Blackmun's dissent shows, the fact that 
Maryland could have directly prohibited the conduct it pU:rported to 
fear, but chose instead more broadly to prohibit vertical integration, 
suggests that Maryland was concerned with more than just local 
conduct. 83 
In sum, I believe the Court, in Exxon, failed to perceive the 'vital 
interstate interests at stake, or to understand the role of the commerce 
clause in mediating those interests. Whether from fear of reviving 
economic due process analysis or overemphasis on state regulatory 
autonomy, the Court's opinion appears tobe a disservice to commerce 
clause principles. Significantly, however, the Exxon opinion purported 
to distinguish, not overrule, prior commerce clause cases, and thus 
casts no doubt on the validity of those cases in which the Court has 
closely scrutinized state regulation under the commerce clause, 84 cases 
that continue to stand as a substantial limitation on state regulatory 
authority. 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Procedural due process is the third constitutional principle limiting 
state regulation. 85 Before depriving anyone of constitutionally protected 
"437 U.S. at 140, n.7 (dissenting opinion). 
"'Id. at 144-45. Interestingly, one year after the Supreme Court decision in Exxon; the 
Governor of Maryland suspended operation of the divestiture statute for fear that the 
closing of even the few company-owned stations in Maryland would further lengthen the 
gas lines and shorten tempers in that energy-hungry state. \Nashington Post, june 27, 
!979, at 10, col. 1. 
'·'In addition to the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 42-57 supra, see 
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (although statute is facially 
neutral, regulation is unconstitutional where impact is discriminatory); Nelson v. Sears, 
Roebuck 8c Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) (burden on interstate commerce determined by facts, 
not abstractions); Best & Co. v. rviaxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940) (court must determine 
whether statute will, in practical operation, work discrimination against interstate 
commerce). 
"U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1: " ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " 
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liberty86 or property,87 a state must follow procedures that are funda-
mentally f~ir, 88 procedures shaped to take into account the nature of the 
interests affected, the importance of procedural formality in reaching a 
correct and acceptable result,. and the government interest in achieving 
its goals without -undue delay or expense. 89 
' 
In the context of competition policy, the, i973 Supreme ,Court 
decision in Gibson v. Berryhill90 provides a fundamental principle: The 
determination whether, and to what extept, unfettered competition 
should be restrained may not be made by one with a "subs.t;;tntial 
••see gener:atly Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal ancl.Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. l (1979) (interest in discretionary parole is not protected liberty); Meachum v. 
Fano, 427 U,S. 215 (1976) (transfer to less desirable,prison is not deprivation of liberty in 
absence of state-created expectancy); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (loss of 
good time credits is loss of liberty wht;re right to cr~dits is given .by state law); G'\gnon v. 
Scarpeili, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of probation is deprivation ofliberty); Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole is deprivation of liberty); Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (adverse publicity hot deprivation of liberty when not 
accompanied by government change in status); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 
( 1971) (adverse publicity deprives one of liberty when accompanied by separate depriva-
tion of prior status); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U:S. 564 (1972) (mere 
refusal to rehire, without stated reasons, invades no reputation interest); Bishop v. Wood, 
426 U.S. 341 (1976) (deprecating comments not made public after discretionary firing do 
not invade liberty interest); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (due process not required 
to contest injurious but true statements). See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
( 1923) (liberty denotes "right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire 1,1seful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enj9y those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men"). · 
"'See generally Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. I (1979) (state law creates entitlement property interest in discretionary parole); 
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. I (1978) (state law creates 
entitlement property interest in utility services); Goss v. Lopez, 4I9 U.S. 565 (1975) 
(property includes state-guaranteed entitlement to schooling); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134 (1974) (concurring and dissenting opinions: continued employment is property 
interest created by Congress); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (entitlement 
property interest in continued employment may be derived from informal rules and 
understandings). 
86The theme of fundamental fairness was espoused by Justice Frankfurter in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 34I U.S. 123, I61 (1951): "[T]hus to maim ... 
an organization ... [ostensibly] engaged in lawful objectives is so devoid of fundamental 
fairness as to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Adm.endment" (concurring 
opinion). See also his dissent in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, I6 (1950). 
""Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (I976); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). See 
generally H. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing" 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1299-1300 (1973); 
Mashaw, The Supreme Courl's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 501-563 (I978). 
9041I u.s. 564 (1973). 
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pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the decision.91 ln~Gibson, the Court_ 
enjoined the Alabama Board of Optometry from determining whether 
the sale of optometric services through a corporation was "unprofession-
al_ conduct." Because the Board consisted solely of single practitioners, 
who would benefit if competition from corporate practitioners were 
suppressed, the Board was deemed to be too interested in the outcome 
of the controversy to render a fair judgment.~2 Without acknowledging 
it, the Supreme Court seemed to resurrect under due process prihciples 
a moribund line of cases standing for the proposition that "one [private] 
person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of 
another, arid especially of a competitor."93 · 
Last terrh, however, in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 94 the 
Court seems to have withdrawn, at least slightly, from that prh1ciple. In 
Fox, the Supreme Court reviewed and upheld California legislation that 
permits established franchised dealers, by filing a protest with the state 
New Motor Vehicle Board, to delay the establishment of new, competing 
franchises until the state board holds a hearing and determines whether 
the new franchise is in the public interest. 95 General Motors and two of _ 
its new, prospective franchisees challenged the statute after a protest by 
competing franchisees delayed one new franchise for over fifteen 
months. 
The Fox opinion is encrusted with ambiguity, so much so that Lhree 
Justices s~gned two concurring, explanatory opinions96 taking contrary 
views of the proper basis for upholding the legislation. In an attempt to 
straighten out this ambiguity, let me outline and comment on the 
applicable principles. First, it is clear-and all the Justices agreed-that 
the Constitution does not prohibit a state from requiring a company to 
secure permission from a state agency before franchising a new dealer. 97 
"'Id. at 579. 
"'Id. at 570, 579. 
"'Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 3ll (1936). See also Eubank v. City ·of 
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
"'439 U.S. 96 (1978). 
95/d. at 103. The "good cause" determination, like the licensing authority exercised by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "public interest" standard, required the 
board to consider the adequacy of existing competition and customer care, the permanen-
cy of investment, the effect on the retail motor vehicle business, and whether the new 
dealer "would increase competition and therefore be in the public interest." 439 U.S. at 
109, n.l3. 
••justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in which justice Powell joined. 439 U.S. 
at ll3. Justice Marshall wrote a separate concurring opi!lion. Id. at Ill. 
"'I d. at 106 (opinion of the Court), 111 (Marshall, J.), 113 (Biackmun and Powell, JJ.), 
ll9, n.31 (Stevens,].). 
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The demise cJf economic due process has freed the· states to invade 
liberty and property interests in order to promote the public welfare, 
regardless of the wisdom or economic effect of the legislation.98 Thus, 
those portions of the majority opinion indicating that there is no "right" 
to freely ·franchise are certainly correct; any interest in unfettered 
franchising may pe taken away by the state. 99 However, although there is 
no right to franchise, there is a right to procedural due process when a 
liberty or property interest is taken away, 100 and the plaintiffs claimed 
that it is a denial of due process to allow a competitor to decide whether 
free franchising should be permitted-pending a state determination. 
That position raises the issue of whether or not the interest in freely 
franchising is a Fberty or property interest protected by the procedural 
guarantee of the Constitution. Although u'!e majority's opit-':tion is 
ambiguous on this point, the concurring opinion of Justices Blackmun 
and Powell is perfectly clear, and in my view, perfectly wrong. To them, 
plaintiffs "demonstrated ... no liberty or property interest" to which 
due process applied. 101 But, as even these Justices admit, long-standing 
constitutional doctrine has defined "liberty" to include "the right to 
engage ip an}' of the common occupations of life,"102 and should 
therefore have been interpreted to encompass the liberty to establish 
new franchises. None of the cases marking the end of economic due 
process purported to deny those liberty and property interests, 103 and it 
was precisely that liberty and property interest that was protected by the 
98/d. at 106-107, citing, among other cases, North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
(1963). See note 2 supra, and accompanying text, for a brief discussion of economic due 
process. 
99439 U.S. at 107-108: "California's Legislature was ... constitutionally empowered to 
enact a general scheme _of business regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions ... 
States may ... require businesses to secure regulatory approval before engaging in 
specified practices." (emphasis in original) 
100The requirements of procedural due process can be triggered by even slight 
deprivations of protected liberty or property. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) 
(suspension from school for 10 days is protected interest). 
101439 U.S. at 114. 
10
'/d., at 113, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), quoted with approval in Board 
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
10
'See cases cited in note 3 supra. 1n other words, the demise of the Lochner era, supra note 
2, resulted not from a redefinition of the liberty interests protected by the Constitution, 
but from a reappraisal of the nature of the protection given those interests. With the 
demise of substantive, econmnic due process, the substantive standards for taking away 
liberty interests are now primarily a legislative matter, governed by the Constitution only 
to the extent that other constitutional provisions (such as the equal protection clause) or the 
weak minimum rationality test are controlling. The procedural framework within which 
liberty interests may be taken away, on the other hand, should be protected by the 
Constitution. Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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Court in Gibson. 10"1 Therefore, although they have no right to franchise 
at will, or without delay, or without seeking prior government approval, 
automobile manufacturers and their new franchisees do have a right to 
procedural due prqcess before their liberty interest in establishing a new 
business is taken away. 
The central question is thus: What procedures are due? Clearly, 
California legislation forbidding new franchising would comply ·with 
due' process.105 But equally d~arly, California could not, consistent with 
due process, forbid new franchising until a license had been obtained 
from a board consisting of 'existing automobile franchisees; Gibson v. 
Berryhill prohibits a state from establishing a licensing board made up of 
persons with a "substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the 
licensing proceedings, 106 and it takes ·no in1agination: lo see thit existing 
franchisees have a pecuniary interest in suppressing competition from 
ne\AJ franchisees. 
California, of course, did ~omething different. It established an 
impartial board with the power to halt new franchising if good cause for 
doing so were shown by existing dealers. 107 This, too, comports with due 
process, provided the board is truly impartial and follows reasonable 
procedures for notice and an opportunity to be heard. But California 
went furthe~~it gave_ existing franchisees the al)thority to invoke state 
power by automatically blocking new franchi:'ijng pending the state 
agency's good cause determination. The majority upheld this aspect of 
the California scheme, reasoning that because the state itself could halt 
new franchises pending a hearing-and could ·decide not to invoke its 
power if nobody protested-the state could also decide that it would 
temporarily block new franchis1ng only when a protest is filed. 
While logically appealing, this conclusion, it seems to me, fails to 
recognize the important difference between governmentally iJ11posed 
104Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Although the Supreme Court did not define 
the property or liberty interests protected in Gibson, and, if it had, could have applied the 
"entitlement" theory, note 87 supra, it affirmed the district court decision in Gibson, which 
relied squarely on the j\-Jeyer rationale. See 331 F. Supp. 122, 126 (N.D. Ala. 1971). 
105The legislative process, of course, is due process ·when the legislature acts through its 
accepted, representational procedures. Linde, Due Pmcess of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 
197, 242 (1978). Compan Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955): "For 
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the 
courts," quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
10
'411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); 
1
"'439 U.S. at 103. 
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and priVately imposed restraints. Under the California scheme, no 
legislature or state administrator determined that franchising should be 
halted pending a hearing; as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, 
the "uninformative words I protest"108 are enough to enjoin new 
franchisihg temporarily. The only state determination made prior to the 
good cause determination of the board was a legislative determination 
that new franchising should be halted whenever a protesting person 
decided it should be, and that seems to me to be delegating the decision 
to one who is least qualified to make the decision on behalf of the state. 
Maybe the time has come when a state interest in protectionism is 
sufficient to allow the state to delegate decision making to the persons to 
be protected, but I would have thought that notion was barred by a long 
line of constitutional jurisprudence. 109 
My point, of course, is a narrow one, perhaps one with more 
philosophical than practical content. In the context of the Fox case, the 
restraint imposed was temporary, the state board had jurisdiction dver 
the conflict as soon as the protest was filed, and the board could then 
adjust the conflicting interests as it saw fit. Moreover, because it is 
acknowledged that the state could pass legislation blocking all new 
franchising, the scheme actually adopted by California might seem like a 
less restrictive alternative. But I believe an important difference exists 
between restraints imposed by government decision and restraints 
imposed by private decision, especially where the private person has an 
obvious persomu stake in the outcome of the decision. It is not enough to 
say that the legislature made a policy choice when it entrusted the 
decision to a private interest. That is true in all procedural due process 
cases-the legislature makes a choice as to the procedures for enforcing 
the rights and obligations it created. 110 But in all cases, the procedures 
adopted are subject to the procedural res_traints of the due process 
clause, and I would have preferred an outcome that forces California 
itself to take responsibility for denying the liberty to franchise. 
108439 U.S. at 121. 
109 See cases cited in note 93 supra. 
"
0A majority of the Court has never adopted the positiOn, advanced by Justice 
Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), that a state's authority to define the 
scope of property interests protected by due process necessarily gives the state authority to 
determine the procedures by which the property may be taken away. Compare Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Although the Court did 
not recognize it, in many ways the Fox rationale resembles the Rehnquist view-namely, 
that the state's authority to take away the liberty to franchise also gives it the authority to 
condition that liberty on any procedural basis it finds appropriate. 
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SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
The fourth 'source of constitutional restraint on state regulation is the 
supremacy clause, m under which federal law displaces inconsistent state 
law and regulation. Because it depends on congressional enactment, of 
course, this source of constitutional restraint is not self-executing; but it 
is potentially powerfuC The only limitation on Congress's preemptive 
power is that Congress must act within the sphere of its authoriiy, 
authority delimited primarily by the commerce power and the concept 
of state sover:eignty. 11 ~ · 
Thus far, Congt~ss's preemptive power in the field of competition 
policy has been restrained by the Supreme Court's judgnient that 
Congress never inten,ded the Sherman Act to apply to state actioi:t. 'This, 
as you know, is what'is now affectionately called the Parkef-Goldfarb-
Cantor-Eates-Lafayeite-Fox113 doctrine, so named because 'the· doctrine 
appears to have as many facets as a dowager's diamond. Although I will 
not examine the Parker doctrine itself today, I do want to discuss briefly 
the relationship between the Parker doctrine and FTC preemption 
authority, an .issue raised by the. program of preemption the FTC has 
initiated under its Magnuson-Moss114 rulemaking power. As you know, 
the most notable example of the FTC's preemption activism is the 
lllU.S. CoN sT. art. VI, d. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme La.w of the Land;·and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
112See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress may not extend 
minimum wage provisions to state and local government employees). Chief Justice Burger 
has noted the ~·strikingly similar" language in Usery and Parker, infra note 113, which 
established the antitrust state action doctrine, Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 
435 U.S. 389, 423 (1978) (concurring opinion), and some have argued that the Usery 
doctrine may. prohibit Congress from reversing Parker by seeking to apply the antitrust 
la\;ls to state action. See. Davidson and Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional 
Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 V AND. L. REv. 575 (1978). In 
view of the narrow interpretations of Usery by lower courts, however, this seems unlikely. 
See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. SEC, 434 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (three-judge court), 
appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978) (SEC may investigate offer and sale of securities by a 
city); Public Service Co. of North Carolina v. FERC, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 100 
S. Ct. 166 (1979) (requirement ofFERC approval for abandonment under Natural Gas Act 
is applicable to state~owmid gas); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d C]r.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (federal Clean Air Act may be applied to compel enforcement 
of city transportation control plan). 
113Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 
(1975); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.; 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); 
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox. Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). 
11488 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45 et seq. (Supp. 1979)) .. 
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eyeglass rule, 115 which attempts to nullify state laws that prohibit price 
advertising of eyeglasses by making their enforcement an unfair act or 
practice. 
The FTC claim of preemptive power is founded on a straightforward 
supremacy clause argument: Trade regulation rules have the force and 
effect of federal law and thereby preempt conflicting state or local 
laws. 116 The premise of this argument is true; validly adopted legislative 
rules have the same preemptive effect as congressionallegislation.117 But 
the more fundamental question is the Parker question: Did Congress 
ever intend the FTC Act to apply to state action? Clearly, if the FTC Act 
itself does not apply to state action, no r~le promulgated under the Act 
can apply to, or displace, or preempt state action. Thus, the issue is 
whether Congress intended state regulatory legislation to be subject to 
review by a five-person Commission sitting in Washington. 
We will not have a definitive answer to this question, of course, until 
one of the cases challenging the new rules is decided, 118 but it seems to 
me inconceivable that Congress intended this form of economic due 
process review. Although most commentators have assumed that the 
Parker doctrine applies to the FTC Act and Clayton Act, 119 a view 
115 16 C.F.R. § 456.9(2) (ophthalmic goods and services). See also 16 C . .F.R. § 436.3, n.2 
and 43 Fed. Reg. 59,719 (Dec. 21, 1978) (franchising); 16 C.F.R. § 438.9 (vocational and 
home study schools) ("trade regulation rule preempts any provision of any state Jaw, rule, 
or regulation which is inconsistent or otherwise frustrates the purpose of ... this trade 
regulation rule .... ") 
116See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 59,719-720 (Dec. 21, 1978). 
117Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (agricultural regulations); Fry v. 
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (federal pay board regulations); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 
663 (1962); Pljblic Uti!. Comm'n v. United States,_355 U.S. 534 (1958). 
llBPending cases are listed in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 38,001 (1979). After the 
preparation of this article, two courts of appeals raised a question about, but did not 
decide, the scope of the FTC's preemption power. Katharine Gibbs School v. FTC, I 980-I 
Trade Cas.~ 63,077 (2d Cir. 1979), reh. denied, 1980-1 Trade Cas.~ 63,254 (2d Cir. 1980); 
American Optometric Ass'n v. FTC, 1980-1 Trade Cas.~ 63,165 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
119See articles collected in Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REv. 715, n.5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Harvard Note], which takes a contrary view, as does Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the 
Federa/Trade Commission, 1976 Dmrn L.J. 225, (1976) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil Article]. 
For articles concluding that the Parker doctrine applies to the FTC Act, see Davidson and 
Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of 
Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 575 (1978); Badal, Restrictive State Laws and the 
Federal Trade Commission, 29 AD. L. REv. 239 (1977); and Comment, The FTC Proposed 
Regulation of Prescription Drug Price Disclosures by Retail Pharmacists, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 
(1976). See also FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION. REPORT OF THE STATE REGULATION TASK 
FoRCE, March 14, 1978. 
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supported by sixty years of FTC inaction against state action, there is no 
particularly strong precedent/2P the closest being a 197 4 California 
district court decision, taking what I believe to be the correct position 
and barring the FTC from challenging state action. 121 As for legislative 
history, if we are guided by the Parker Court's admonition that "an 
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control ... is not lightly to be 
attributed to Congress,"122 legislative history is singularly unsupportive 
of FTC power. Although some have snatched minutiae of legislative 
history to support the FTC's preemptive power, their citations rarely 
refer directly to the FTC's power to overturn state action. m 
""Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d I, 7, n.l5 (4th Cir. 1974) (dictum: Parker 
applies to FTC Act), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Asheville Tobacco Board of 
Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959) (same dictum, but no state action so 
applicability of FTC Act to state action not raised). Cases stating that state authorization of 
activity does not override ail FTC prohibition are inapposite because, under Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp:, 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (state may not authorize Sherman Act 
violations), they involve no Parker state action. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 
(8th Cir. 1926); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. I 959); Peerless Prods., Inc. 
v. FTC, 284 F.2d. 825 (7th Cir. I960),cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (196I). 
121California exrel. Christensen v. FTC, I974-2 Trade Cas.~ 75,328 (N.D. Cal. I974), rev'd 
an other grounds, 549 F.2d I32I (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). 
"'3I7 u.s. 34I, 35I (I943). 
"'See Verkuil Article, supra note 119, at 233-243, Harvard Note, supra note 119, at 
742-3, n.I67. Preemption is not necessarily the same question as the applicability of the 
FTC Act to state action. The FTC Act surely preempts inconsistent state law that does not 
amount to state action (e.g., when a state merely approves an antitrust violation), but if the 
FTC Act does not apply to state action, no question of preemption arises. Thus, references 
to preemption in the legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss, FTC Improvement Act do 
not necessarily address the state action question. 
Moreover; even if references to preemption in the legislative history were taken as 
references to state action, the evidence supporting the Verkuil position is meager. The 
earliest version of the FTC Improvements Act, S. 320I, 9Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), was 
reported out of the Senate Commerce Committee with an explicit provision for 
preemption of state law in cases of conflict, but this bill did not pass the Senate. In I 97 I, 
the Senate passed a bill enlarging FTC jurisdiction and rule-making powers, S. 986, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (197I). It contained no preemption provision, but the report accompany-
ing the bill did assert that the bill empowered the FTC to specify the extent to which state 
law was preempted by its rules. S. REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (l97I). This bill 
received no House consideration. A similar Senate bill introduced in I 973 again contained 
a provision allowing the FTC to specify the extent to which state law was preempted, S. 
356, 93d Cong., Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), but the bill was reported out of committee without 
a rule-making or preemption provision. The present rule-making section, which is silent 
on the preemption issue, was then added by the House. The report accompanying the 
House bill notes that the expanded power granted the FTC is "not intended to occupy the 
field or in any way to preempt state or local agencies from carrying out consumer 
protection or other activities within their jurisdiction .... " H.R. REP. No. I I 07, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 45 (1974): This final reference to preemption in the legislative history states only 
that FTC rules do not "occupy to field," Harvard Note, supra note I I 9, at 742-43, n.I69, 
but says nothing about the applicability of FTC rules to state action. 
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Som~ have~ pointed out that the FTC Act, in contrast to the Sherman 
Act, has only prospective remedies, no private enforce.ment and broader 
substantive reach; and have argued that these differences should render 
the Parker doctrine inapplicable to FTC actions. 124 It has also been 
argued that the FTC's rulemaking procedures provide a forum in which 
the state regulatory interests may be balanced against federal interests in 
vigorous competitiori. 125 
But these differences do not speak to the essential concern of Parker: 
That the state, as a sovereign entity within the federal system, has a right 
to regulate its intrastate competition unless Congress expressly man-
dates otherwise. 
In short, although prediction is risky, I would be surprised if any 
court were to_' uphold the FTC's authonty to prohibit or nullify state 
action. 
To reach this conclusion is not to say, however, that the FTC has no 
power to preempt state law. If the state action doctrine does not protect 
state regulation, then state law is preempted whenever it conflicts with 
federal law or valid federal rules. Thus, a state statute authorizing 
private restraints of trade, without active state supervision, is not 
protected by the state action doctrine126 and may be preempted by a 
valid rule. Similarly, under the reasoning in Lafayette, 127 regulatory or 
anticompetitive proprietary action of a municipality or other state 
subdivision is immune from FTC supervision only if the conduct is 
authorized in powers delegated by the state legislature. But the precise 
contour of the state action doctrine is itself an intricate subject, and I will 
duck it today. 128 
One final, perhaps academic point: Even if the state action doctrine 
does not insulate a state regulatory sch~me from FTC review, FTC 
124See Harvard Note, supra note 119, at 731-35; Verkuil Article, supra note 119, at 
234-35. 
125See Harvard Note, supra note 119, at 738, 745-49. 
126See, e.g., Schwegrnann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); New 
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). 
127City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,416--17 (1978). 
msee generally Handler, Antitrust 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374-1388 (1978); 
AREEDA & TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAw, 66--116 (1978); Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs and 
Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 31 
(1979); Rogers, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. CoLO. L. REv. 147 (1978); First, 
Private Interest and Public Control: Government Action, The First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 
1975 UTAH L. REv. 9 (1975). 
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preemption power extends only insofar as the FTC has jurisdiction 
under the "in or affecting commerce" standard. If any purely local 
commerce is left, 1 ~ 9 it is subject only to state regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
You have no doubt recognized an ambiguity in my talk. On the one 
hand, I read several constitutional principles as continuing to limit state 
anticompetitive regulation. 130 On theo other hand, I focus on several 
recent cases that have eschewed an intensive review of state regulation. 
In part this may come from the professorial aptitude for declaring some 
cases to be wrongly decided and then dismissing them as uninfluentia1 in 
the development of the law. But I believe my view results more from a 
belief that both the commerce clause and the due process clause do 
contain principles that limit state autonomy to interfere with competitive 
freedom, and that as the Court moves away from the hovering shadow 
'"See, e.g., Diversified Brokerage Servs. Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Bd. of Realtors, 521 
F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1975) (five real estate transactions involving out-of-state persons is 
insufficient nexus); Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. 1276 
(E.D. Mich. 1969), affd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970) 
(out-of-state student renters and out-of-state construction materials are insufficient nexus). 
But see McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 1980-l Trade Cas.'!! 63, l 07 (1980); 
Goidfarb v. Virginia State Bar._42l U.S. 723 (1975); United States v. Greater Syracuse Bd. 
of Realtors, 449 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (financing guaranteed by out-of-state 
sources and association with out-of-state referral agencies and relocation services is 
sufficient nexus); Oglesby and Barclift, Inc. v. Metro MLS Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. '!! 61,064 
(E.D. Va. 1976) (mortgage funding from out-of-state sources, advertisement in paper with 
interstate circulation, and transactions with armed forces members moving interstate, 
constitutes sufficient nexus). 
''"Three other clauses of the Constitution place only insignificant limitations on st;:Jte 
regulation. The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV protects individuals, 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), but not corporations. See 'Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 
(8 Wall.) 168, lSI (1868). Under the equal protection clause, U.S. CoN ST. amend. XIV, § 1, 
state social or economic legislation may not create classifications that are not "reasonable in 
light of[the statutory} purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). But the 
Court has been.unwilling to scrutinize closely either the public purpose or the rationality 
of the classifications, invalidating "only that government choice which is 'clearly wrong, a 
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."' TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAw§ 16-4 at 997 (1978), quoting Mathews v. De Castro, -429 U.S. 181, 185 (l 975). 
See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (upholding 
apprenticeship requirement that effectively 'preserved the business for relatives and 
friends); ~Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding regulation of 
opticians that was not also applied to sellers of ready-to-wear glasses); City of New Orleans 
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding exemp.tion of two vendors from regulation of 
businesses in French Quarter). New applications of the contract clause, U.S. CoN sT. art. I, 
§ 10, suggest limitations on the power of the state to abridge existing contracts, but have 
not been applied in the competition area. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234 (1978) (invalidating Minnesota pension legislation); United States Trust Co. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating legislation that relieved state of contractual 
obligation). 
PETER M. GERHART 1379 
of the-· economic due process era, and as more challenges to state 
regulation are brought before it, the Court will find those principles. 
MR. PoLLOCK: I suggest that, in conjuring up an appropriate mental 
image for our next topic, you think now, not of an argument before the 
Supreme Court, but rather of a crowded conference room in a lawyer's 
office, where a deposition is going on in a treble damage case. You know 
what these depositions are. They frequently are boring, going on for 
days. Now, what possible constitutional issue could arise in that kind of 
context? I think our m~xt speaker, Josef D. Cooper, will make very clear 
how that situation in some cases may almost bristle with constitutional 
issues. 
Joe Cooper practices in San Francisco. He is a lawyer with an extensive 
background in treble damage litigation, primarily on the plaintiff's side. 
He currently is completing his term as chairman of this Section's Private 
Litigation Comm~ttee. After graduating from the University of Chicago 
Law School, Joe spent his apprenticeship as a staff attorney for the 
Coordinating Committee for Multidistrict Litigation, where he partici-
pated in drafting the very first version of the now celebrated Manual for 
Complex Litigation, and also as a special assistant to Judge Pence in the 
West Coast Pipe Cases. 
For the past ten years, while he has been engaged in private practice, 
he has been frequently confronted with the question that is at the core of 
his remarks today on "Fifth. Amendment Rights/ in Private Treble 
Damage Litigation." Joe Cooper. 
